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Carbon Capitalism
WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: ESTABLISHING AN EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME IN CHINA
THOMAS LEE
“Popular grassroots activism a is major 
driving force pushing the largest emitter 
on the planet to take concrete climate 
action.”
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When discussing energy policy for mitigating global cli-mate change, China is the single most important coun-try to examine. It has been the largest national emitter 
of greenhouse gases since 2007, accounting for almost 30% of 
global emissions,1 and is projected to contribute more than half 
of the increase in world emissions.2 Even on a per capita basis, the 
most populous nation emits 7.2 tons of carbon dioxide per person, 
exceeding the world average of 5.1 tons and the EU’s 6.8 tons3. In 
response, China is taking significant steps of leadership on cli-
mate action: the government has pledged significant mitigation 
targets, while setting realistic plans to implement these targets 
through its proposed national cap-and-trade system.
Following a series of local pilot programs, China’s National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission (NDRC) announced on August 31, 
2014 to establish a national carbon emissions trading scheme that 
aims to be operational by 20164. On December 10, 2014, the NDRC 
officially released its “Interim Regulatory Measures for Carbon 
Emissions Trading” for further policy development5. If successful-
ly designed and executed, a Chinese cap-and-trade strategy rep-
resents a crucial victory for economists as well as the planet.
Mitigation Commitements
The large potential for China’s climate policies stem from a context 
of rapid economic development and reliance on fossil fuels. From 
2000 until 2011, China experienced an annual real GDP growth of 
10% on average6. Although GDP growth has slowed from reduced 
industrial production and exports due to counter-inf lation poli-
cies, the current leadership under President Xi and Premier Li is 
still focused on long-term and sustainable growth, particularly 
with an economy driven by greater domestic consumption. The 
persistence of poverty and inequality between regions means 
that economic development will remain a priority.
How will this growth be powered? Currently, the vast majority of 
the Chinese energy mix is fossil fuels with about 70% from coal, 
by consumption7. Energy itself constitutes the largest piece of the 
overall emissions mix. Within energy, the power sector (40%), 
manufacturing sector (23%), and other industrial processes (12%) 
are the three largest contributors to China’s emissions.
figure 1 Visual rep-
resentation of China’s 
energy mix.
Coal: 70%
of China’s Energy Mix
Oil: 18%
Hydropower: 6%
Natural Gas: 4%
Nuclear & Other
Renewables: 2%
1 International Energy Agency. (2014). CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion High-
lights. Retrieved from https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/
CO2EmissionsFromFuelCombustionHighlights2014.pdf
2 U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2011, March 31). Emissions of Green-
house Gases in the U.S. Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/
ghg_report/ghg_overview.cfm
3 Global Carbon Project. (2011). Global Carbon Budget. http://www.globalcarbon-
project.org/carbonbudget/14/hl-full.htm#regionalFF
4 Chen, K. & Reklev, S. (2014, August 31). China’s carbon market to start in 2016 - of-
ficial. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/31/china-carbontrad-
ing-idUSL3N0R107420140831
5 People’s Republic of China National Development and Reform Commission. (2014, 
December 10) Number 17 - Interim Regulatory Measures for Carbon Emissions Trad-
ing. Retrieved from http://qhs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/201412/t20141212_652007.html
6 International Energy Agency. (2014). CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion High-
lights. Retrieved from https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/
CO2EmissionsFromFuelCombustionHighlights2014.pdf
7 Ibid
Electricity/Heat: 40.25%
(4,266.04 MtCO2)
of China’s Emissions
Manufacturing & 
Construction: 23.47% 
(2,487.49 MtCO2)
Industrial Processes: 11.85%
(1,255.72 MtCO2)
Other Fuel Combustion: 6.70%
(710.35 MtCO2)
Agriculture: 6.68%
(708.19 MtCO2)
Transportation: 5.88%
(623.32 MtCO2)
Fugitive Emissions: 2.88%
(304.81 MtCO2)
Waste: 1.86%
(196.68 MtCO2)
Bunker Fuels: 0.45%
(47.57 MtCO2)
“Any policy proposals that ignore the 
market-based approach are inherently 
prone to these downsides of cost-ineffec-
tiveness.”
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In addition to international pressure for stronger climate change 
mitigation efforts, the government leadership faces mounting 
pressure from masses of grassroots environmental protests. In 
2013, the Ministry of Environmental Protection cited 712 cases of 
“abrupt environmental incidents” — an official term for environ-
mentally-inspired protests — a 31% jump from the previous year. 
From the perspective of regime legitimacy, China must contend 
with how its energy system leads to local environmental health 
impacts through associated unrest, regardless of international 
climate change. As a result of this citizen activism, the energy 
policy choices are about more than just  environmental conser-
vation, but about public health - especially respiratory health im-
pacts to local communities due to fossil fuel and manufacturing 
pollution such as particulate matter.  The official policy termi-
nology is shifting towards becoming a “harmonious society” that 
might sacrifice GDP growth for better environmental protection8. 
Popular grassroots activism is a major driving force pushing the 
largest emitter on the planet to take concrete climate action - ev-
ery individual who participated in these 712 “incidents” helped 
push the central and local governments towards re-prioritizing 
people and the planet over pure profits.
Governmental commitment to climate action is not uncharted 
territory: the PRC’s 11th Five Year Plan (2006–2010) successfully 
reduced energy intensity and increased the renewables energy 
share according to target. Within this context, the Chinese gov-
ernment’s 12th Five Year Plan establishes these targets by 2020: 1) 
reduce carbon intensity (emissions per unit of GDP) by 40% to 45% 
compared to 2005 levels, and 2) increase the renewables’ share to 
15%9. Critics often prefer an absolute emissions reduction target 
as opposed to the carbon intensity goal. At the same time, the US 
EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan uses this same approach via 
energy efficiency targets. Moreover, China’s 2020 targets repre-
sent real amounts of emissions abatement compared to the busi-
ness-as-usual scenario: the total abatement from 2011 to 2020 is 
estimated to be 33 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent10.
Emissions Economics
In order to meet these emission reduction commitments as well 
as long-term sustainability goals, the government faces a choice 
between what environmental economists classify as “com-
mand-and-control” mandates and market-based policies that seek 
to price in environmental externalities. From the perspective of 
microeconomic theory, an emissions allowance trading scheme 
can be the most cost-effective method of dealing with global car-
bon pollution.
China has had certain success with its command-and-control, 
which “focuses on regulating the behaviour or performance of in-
dividual factories and power plants”.11 For example, the national 
government launched the Top 1000 Enterprises Energy Conser-
vation Action Program in April 2006, which assigned energy ef-
ficiency mandates for industrial enterprises; by the end of 2008 
the program had saved 106 million tons of CO2 equivalent (tce) 
emissions (2 years ahead of schedule). For its 12th five-year plan 
(2011-2015), the central government expanded this program to the 
Top 10,000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Low Carbon Action 
Program; through its first year of operation the program already 
achieved 69% of its 250 million tce goal12 for the whole five-year 
period.13
However, there are substantial theoretical reasons to prefer a 
market-based approach. Whether framed as negative externali-
ties or a Tragedy of the Commons, activities that emit greenhouse 
gases exemplify negative externalities. For example, a company 
manufactures cement to gain a profit while releasing carbon di-
oxide into the atmosphere; these additional gases exacerbate cli-
figure 2 Visual representation of China’s Emissions by Sector (Excluding Land Use Change & Forestry) - 2011
8 Leggett, J. (2011, July 18). China’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Policies. 
Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/169172.pdf
9 Ibid
10 Ernst & Young. (2015, March 1). Understanding China’s Emissions Trading Schemes 
and Emissions Reporting. Retrieved from
www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Understanding_Chinas_Emissions_
Trading_Schemes_and_Emissions_Reporting/$FILE/EY-Understanding-Chi-
nas-ETS-and-Emissions-Reporting.pdf
11 Keohane, N. & Olmstead, S. (2007) Markets and the Environment. Island Press. 143.
12 Chen, K. & Reklev, S. (2014, August 31). China’s carbon market to start in 2016 - 
official. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/31/china-carbontrad-
ing-idUSL3N0R107420140831
13 Zhang, Z. (2014, June). Nota di Lavoro. Fondazione Eni Erico Mattei. Retrieved from
http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/2014711543244NDL2014-060.pdf
Demonsrators in 
Kunming protest the 
sit ing of a paraxlyene 
(PX) petrochemical 
plant.
PENN SUSTAINABILIT Y REVIEW |  29
mate change and lead to additional environmental harms, that 
are spread across the global society rather than remaining borne 
by the originator company.
How should this public goods problem be resolved? As first intro-
duced by English economist Arthur Pigou in 1920 in The Econom-
ics of Welfare, levying a price exactly equal to the social cost of this 
externality would completely eliminate economic deadweight 
loss - the dreaded triangle of lost social welfare that remains un-
recoverable to either consumers or producers. By virtue of sup-
ply and demand, a market-based pollution policy must result in 
the utilization of the least-cost resources on society’s marginal 
abatement curve while minimizing the opportunity cost (which 
includes anything from private consumption to infrastructure 
investment). On the other hand, any government pursuing com-
mand-and-control has no such guarantee. The reason is simply 
that humans are fallible: an agency might not exactly estimate the 
costs of different abatement technologies and end up choosing the 
relatively more expensive ones as part of the set of pollution solu-
tions. Moreover, these costs may f luctuate over time or change 
depending on which firm is implementing the technology change. 
This presents a problem because in order to achieve “cost-effec-
tive allocation of abatement… the last unit of pollution control 
done by every firm must cost the same amount” - otherwise “there 
would be a way to reallocate abatement at lower cost.”14 So even 
if a non-market approach achieves some laudable abatement tar-
get, the market-based version can achieve the same level at lower 
opportunity costs.  Furthermore, even if they are not explicitly 
labeled with the not-so-f lattering name “command-and-control”, 
any policy proposals that ignore the market-based approach - like 
China’s “Top 1,000” or “Top 10,000” policies - are inherently prone 
to these cost-ineffectiveness downsides.
The Coase Theorem, introduced by the Nobel laureate Ronald 
Coase in 1960 in The Problem of Social Cost, formalizes the foun-
dation for pollution trading, by showing that allocating property 
rights for pollution allows for private bargaining and transfer pay-
ments that lead to the same cost-effective social welfare solution, 
without having to set a universal pollution price. In the context of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, individual firms that 
emit pollution can pay for the right to pollute. According to the 
Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), the main reason that Chi-
na is considering market-based approaches is that the currently 
used “command and control measures to reduce emissions” like 
“closing down coal plants by fiat” are “less efficient than a market 
based trading system.”15
Whether implemented through cap-and-trade or a carbon tax, us-
ing the market-based mechanism of a carbon price should achieve 
the same level of pollution abatement. However, there are import-
ant theoretical differences. Since the exact future energy supply 
and demand functions cannot be perfectly forecasted, a fixed car-
bon price level leads to uncertainty in the actualized level of abate-
ment if there are unexpected demand shocks or technological 
shifts. For example, if Chinese oil production suddenly becomes 
cheaper or if electricity demand exceeds forecasts, then a given 
carbon price level would lead to more emissions than intended – 
causing an overrun in the overall target. This can pose a particu-
lar challenge for China, which is still experiencing rapid growth 
in energy demand accompanied by its strong (albeit stabilizing) 
economic development. Conversely, the uncertainty of market 
conditions means that setting a fixed carbon cap level leads to 
uncertainty in the resulting carbon price level. Given China’s 
massive pressures to actualize its ambitious mitigation targets, 
an uncertain abatement level from a carbon tax is less preferable 
than a cap-and-trade system, which may employ price control to 
stabilize prices within a desired range. Keohane summarizes the 
difference between a carbon tax for which “the regulator must 
know the aggregate MAC curve in order to attain a particular 
level of abatement with an emissions tax” versus a cap-and-trade 
system which “determines the quantity of pollution directly” and 
requires “no other information than the policy target”. Analyti-
cally, simulations have found a hybrid system of a cap with price 
14 Keohane, N. & Olmstead, S. (2007) Markets and the Environment. Island Press. 143.
15 Han, G., Olsson, M. Hallding, K., & Lunsford, D. (2012). China’s Carbon Emission 
Trading: An Overview of Current Development. Stockholm Environment Institute. 
Retrieved from http://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publica-
tions/china-cluster/SEI-FORES-2012-China-Carbon-Emissions.pdf
Ronald Coase provided the theoret ical foundat ions for emissions trading
“Once launched, China’s national trad-
ing scheme will become the single larg-
est emissions market by cap size.”
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range controls can lead to higher economic efficiency that a pure 
tax16. This may partially explain the central government’s strong 
interest in exploring ETS options. 
An additional advantage of a cap-and-trade scheme over a carbon 
tax is the inherent uncertainty in estimating the social cost of car-
bon. To implement an efficient carbon price, it is necessary to use 
some integrated climate-economy model to project future damag-
es from climate change and obtain a discounted present value of 
a marginal unit of carbon pollution17. For example, policymakers 
may utilize economist William Nordhaus’s Dynamic Integrated 
model of Climate and the Economy (DICE). This social cost then 
informs what the economically efficient abatement level is global-
ly or regionally. However, in practice, a national government fac-
es many other pressures and stakeholders, such as international 
climate negotiation and domestic grassroots protests, which can 
impact the ability to implement an efficient solution. These other 
equity and political factors are exogenous to any models comput-
ing the social cost of carbon. In the case of cap-and-trade policies, 
governments are able to a priori determine the desirable level of 
abatement, and the market price will follow through according to 
supply and demand. This ability for a cap-and-trade system to by-
pass any limitations and inaccuracies in social carbon cost mod-
els represents another theoretical advantage of an ETS. 
Of course, a main benefit of a carbon tax is that it is much easier 
to implement since there are fewer administrative complexities, 
once a carbon price level is decided and industry coverage is fi-
nalized. The legal and administrative infrastructure for taxation 
already exists in China. In practice, there are many policy design 
considerations that complicate the theoretical elegance of an “ide-
al” emissions trading system, including cap size, industry cover-
age, and initial permit allocation.
Regional to National
In order to determine how to approach these nuances, the Chi-
nese government has initiated seven regional pilot programs: in 
Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong, Tianjin, Hubei, and 
Chongqing. The success of a comprehensive national emissions 
trading scheme hinges on the experiences with these pilots; les-
sons learned should be applied to the national implementation. 
Amidst drastically different policy designs, these seven pilots 
share some major characteristics. Each one has about 40 to 60% 
coverage of the jurisdiction’s overall emissions: their coverage of 
emitters includes the power and heavy industry (e.g. steel, cement, 
and petrochemical) sectors, as well as large electricity end-users18. 
For each of the pilots, the initial permit allocation starts off as 
mostly free permits, mostly through grandfathering of historical 
benchmark emissions.19
The biggest policy design challenge for both the pilots and the 
eventual national system is the current regulatory backward-
ness of China’s electricity system. Compared to other countries’ 
restructured electricity markets (as in Europe or most American 
states like California) where market mechanisms determine the 
prices for both wholesale and retail markets, China’s power sector 
is heavily regulated. Retail electricity prices in China are strict-
ly regulated by NDRC, with infrequent retail price adjustments, 
meaning generators cannot easily pass on increased carbon costs 
to end consumers20. Moreover, China’s electrical dispatch system 
uses an “equal capacity factor” approach – meaning the grid oper-
ator tries to use electricity from all generation plants at roughly 
equal capacity utilizations in order to assist capital cost recovery 
– as opposed to “economic dispatch” which maintains a merit 
order in order to minimize marginal costs at the moment21. This 
implies that the carbon price would not fully translate to high-
er-emissions generators being used less and vice versa, since the 
dispatch remains impervious to marginal cost.
To address the power sector problem, the Chinese government 
(or NDRC as a policy designer) can try to reform the electricity 
market to fit an ETS or vice versa. Within the theme of China’s 
recent institutional reforms, restructuring the electricity market 
16 Pizer, W. (1997, October). Prices vs. Quantities Revised: The Case of Climate Change. 
Resources for the Future. Retrieved from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/down-
load?doi=10.1.1.474.2521&rep=rep1&type=pdf
17 In other words,  the incremental amount of environmental cost we would attach
18 Song, R. & Lei, H. (2014, January 24). Emissions Trading in China: First Reports 
from the Field. World Resources Institute. Retrieved from http://www.wri.org/
blog/2014/01/emissions-trading-china-first-reports-field
19 Jotzo, F. (n.d.). Emissions Trading in China: Principles, Design Options and Lessons 
from International Practice. Ideas. Retrieved April 5 from https://ideas.repec.org/p/
een/ccepwp/1303.html
20 Teng, F., Wang, X., & Zhiqiang, L. (2014, December). Introducing the emissions trad-
ing system to China’s electricity sector: Challenges and opportunities. Energy Policy, 
75, 39-45. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.08.010
21 RAP. (2013, October). Recommendations for Power Sector Policy in China: Practical 
Solutions for Energy, Climate, and Air Quality. Retrieved from www.raponline.org/
document/download/id/6869 
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for pricing mechanisms and merit dispatch is hugely beneficial 
for overall economic welfare. While there have been local pilots 
for this “deregulation”, comprehensive restructuring probably 
will occur in the longer term compared to the urgency of China’s 
carbon mitigation needs. Thus, there are efficient workarounds 
within an ETS that are already being tested through the Chinese 
pilot programs. Specifically, the pilots deliberately cover both 
electric generators as well end consumers for the embedded emis-
sions in their electric consumption. Rather than “double-count-
ing” emissions, this method of demand-side carbon pricing helps 
to efficiently achieve the desired amount of carbon abatement22. 
An example of a successful demand-side carbon policy is Tokyo’s 
municipal ETS launched in 201023. Of course, there is a tradeoff of 
more transaction costs due to the larger number of downstream 
consumers - something that can be resolved with comprehensive 
power sector reform. 
There are other policy design concerns, including setting a cap 
size that is stringent enough to avoid a price collapse as happened 
in the EU ETS or the Northeast’s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (RGGI). Some of the pilots are already experimenting with 
market stability reserves similar to the one currently being pro-
posed for the EU system24. Furthermore, once the national sys-
tem is launched, the central authorities must establish a strong 
legal enforcement infrastructure at all local government levels 
to ensure compliance, especially because these regional pilots are 
so different. With lessons learned from the pilot programs, the 
NDRC and other central agencies all well poised to design an ef-
fective carbon trading mechanism.
Going Out
In the spirit of China’s Go Out Policy for increasing business 
investment overseas, there are large benefits from extending 
China’s ETS to the international realm. Fundamentally, the the-
oretical underpinning of cap-and-trade’s effectiveness is that 
it allows society to take advantage of heterogeneous abatement 
costs across different firms. In the same way that global free trade 
without protectionism makes everybody better off (at least in the 
scheme of microeconomics) by encouraging production accord-
ing to comparative advantages, a global emissions trading system 
has the potential to make use of different countries’ comparative 
carbon abatement abilities. More international coverage means 
more economic welfare. From an operational standpoint, a larg-
er volume of carbon permits also means more trading liquidity 
and hence a better realization of the theoretically correct price 
of carbon.
Once launched, China’s national trading scheme will become the 
single largest emissions market by cap size, surpassing the EU 
ETS. However, it will not only contribute to global carbon-eco-
nomic efficiency by sheer size alone, it also has the potential to 
serve as a platform to link other regional cap-and-trade systems 
and thus improve cost-effectiveness and market liquidity. The 
government proposal includes plans to for the Chinese system to 
become a hub for other national emissions markets in Asia-Pa-
cific, such as those in New Zealand (launched 2008), Kazakhstan 
(launched 2013), and South Korea (launched 2015)25. Other coun-
tries in the region, including Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam, 
are also deliberating emissions trading policies.
From the perspective of the global climate system, national 
boundaries are arbitrary and their existence will not prevent 
the laws of physics to act on the ever-increasing atmospheric 
carbon dioxide concentrations. Alas, we do not live in libertarian 
or anarchist utopia: nation-states exist and the wisdom of their 
respective climate policies will determine the fate of humanity. 
The emissions trading in China, if properly designed, will lead to 
significant efficiency benefits from an economic standpoint and 
lead towards a lower carbon future — the impacts of Chinese cap-
and-trade will eclipse in magnitude any single corporate sustain-
ability initiative (which inherently ignores optimizing market 
efficiency). Undoubtedly, China’s commitment to a market-based 
solution to climate change can teach us all a lesson, especially the 
U.S. (whose Senate somehow still does not believe in anthropo-
genic climate change, based on its recent scientifically-illiterate 
vote on the Keystone XL Pipeline amendment). When future gen-
erations look back at how we resolve the most urgent environ-
mental crisis faced by our species right now, it is ultimately the 
citizen activists - who are risking arrest to speak out and protest 
for systematic change in a country not known for its free speech 
protection - who will have made history. 
22 Jotzo, F. (n.d.). Emissions Trading in China: Principles, Design Options and Lessons 
from International Practice. Ideas. Retrieved April 5 from https://ideas.repec.org/p/
een/ccepwp/1303.html
23 Bureau of the Environment. Tokyo Metropolitan Government. (2010, March). To-
kyo-Cap-and-Trade Program: Japan’s first mandatory emissions trading scheme.  Re-
trieved from https://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/en/attachement/Tokyo-cap_and_
trade_program-march_2010_TMG.pdf
24 European Commission. (2014). Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament 
and of the Council. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/
docs/com_2014_20_en.pdf
25 Chen, K. & Reklev, S. (2014, August 31). China’s carbon market to start in 2016 - 
official. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/31/china-carbontrad-
ing-idUSL3N0R107420140831
